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Abstract In this paper, we show that modal logic is
a valuable tool for the formal analysis of human er-
rors in aviation safety. We develop a modal logic called
Agent Safety Logic (ASL), based on epistemic logic,
doxastic logic, and a safety logic grounded in a flight
safety manual. We identify a class of human error that
has contributed to several aviation incidents involving
a specific kind of pilot knowledge failure, and formally
analyze it. The use of ASL suggests how future avionics
might increase aircraft safety.
1 Introduction
Modal logic provides a rich set of tools for formal meth-
ods research. We apply modal logic to the domain of
aviation safety to reason about pilot behavior during
mishaps. Central to the quality of a pilot’s decision-
making is his situational awareness. Situational aware-
ness is generally agreed to involve the pilot’s knowing
the pertinent facts of the aircraft’s state so as to predict
its behavior in a changing environment. Danger arises
when the pilot lacks knowledge of the aircraft’s state,
but does not realize he lacks it. Thus there is a diver-
gence between what the pilot believes to be the case and
the actual state of the world. This divergence affects his
actions, the quality of which often determine the out-
come of the mishap. Formal methods from philosophy,
mathematics, computer science, and economics have
Seth Ahrenbach
Department of Computer Science, University
of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, USA
E-mail: Seth.Kurtenbach@gmail.com
Alwyn Goodloe
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia
E-mail: a.goodloe@nasa.gov
been used to model and reason about an agent’s knowl-
edge, beliefs, and rational decision-making. Specifically,
epistemic logic allows logicians to reason formally about
an agent’s state of knowledge. Doxastic logic allows logi-
cians to reason formally about an agent’s state of belief.
We introduce a Safety modality for reasoning about the
quality of a pilot’s actions, whether they are safely per-
mitted. We use the resulting logic, Agent Safety Logic
(ASL), to analyze a class of aviation incidents involving
a failure of what is called negative introspection: know-
ing what one’s unknowns are. Simply put, the combined
logics allow us to trace a logical thread from the pilot’s
actions to the information he lacks.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents
summaries of several aviation incidents spanning the
past 40 years and identifies the relevant knowledge fail-
ures that played a crucial role in the pilots’ dangerous
actions. Section 3 introduces the modal logics we shall
combine into ASL, and apply ASL to the class of pilot
errors previously identified. Section 4 identifies future
work. Section 5 discusses related work, and Section 6
concludes.
2 The Problem
This section provides summaries of several aviation
incidents that involve a failure of negative introspection
as an important component. We should note that we do
not claim that a failure of negative introspection is the
sole cause of any of these incidents. What typically hap-
pens in these cases is that the avionics encounters some
contradiction in its data and gives control of the air-
plane to the pilot. The pilot then comes to rely on the
false piece of data, not realizing that it is in conflict with
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other sources of information. He then provides input to
the airplane that makes the situation worse. We focus
on this one aspect of what is undoubtedly a much larger
chain of events contributing to the crash. Indeed, a va-
riety of factors often contribute to aviation incidents.
Likewise, the interaction among crew members often
contributes to the incident in complex ways. We hope
to analyze the information flow among crew members
in future work, but for this paper we show that our for-
mal methods can successfully analyze a single moment
of action for the pilot flying.
The following cases are all crewed flights that ex-
perienced a complex sequence of failures leading to fa-
tal accidents. One element of each sequence involves a
pilot not knowing that he does not know some impor-
tant piece of information about the state of the plane,
and taking incorrect actions. The pilot is confused, but
unaware of the missing or contradictory data that is
the true source of the confusion. We draw a distinction
between simple confusion and this particular kind of
knowledge failure for the following reason: if a pilot is
simply confused about some state of the aircraft, and
knows what he is confused about, he has available to
him many protocols that can clear up his confusion or
mitigate risk in spite of the confusion. Often, he can
look to other instruments, or if that’s not an option,
provide control inputs specific to the type of confusion
he is experiencing. For example, merely being confused
about one’s airspeed is not necessarily a problem, be-
cause a certain combination of thrust and pitch will
guarantee that airspeed remains in a safe envelope un-
til the problem is resolved. Pilots learn these procedures
during training, and flight operations manuals specify
which procedures to take in various circumstances.
The problems here arise when the pilot is unaware
of the nature of his confusion, or fails to cross-check his
instrument with the other instruments. In these situa-
tions, the pilot does not know that he does not know
something, and may provide control inputs that make
the situation worse, based on his false belief. It is this
special kind of confusion, unawareness, that plays a role
in the following cases.
Air India flight 855 from Mumbai, India to
Dubai, UAE, January 1, 1978 [23] [21]. The Boeing
747 was flying over the Arabian Sea at night, when the
captain’s Attitude Indicator became incorrectly fixed in
a right bank position. After miscommunication with the
First Officer, whose Attitude Indicator read correctly,
the pilot came to mistakenly believe that the plane was
in a right bank, and directed the aircraft into a steep left
bank. An additional backup Attitude Indicator would
have settled the matter, but the Flight Engineer’s at-
tempt to draw this to the pilot’s attention proved too
late, as seconds later the aircraft crashed into the sea.
Aeroperu flight 603 from Miami, Florida to
Santiago, Chile, October 2, 1996 [14]. Around mid-
night and shortly after takeoff, the pilots became over-
whelmed by a series of contradictory alarms, prevent-
ing an accurate assessment of the state of the Boeing
757. They knew they had a serious problem, but their
specific knowledge failure here concerned their true al-
titude. A maintenance worker had placed tape over the
static ports, which are required for a variety of instru-
ment readings, including altitude. Among the contra-
dictory alarms was the ground proximity warning sys-
tem, which the pilots ignored, believing it to be a false
alarm. According to the incident report, they believed
the alarm was false because an Air Traffic Controller re-
ceived the aircraft’s false instrument readings, and read
them back to the pilots as if they were independently
confirmed. Unable to verify their altitude visually, and
failing to notice the more accurate radar altitude read-
ing due to information overload, the pilots allowed the
plane to descend to the ocean’s surface.
Birgenair flight 301 from Puerto Plata, Do-
minican Republic to Frankfurt, Germany, Febru-
ary 6, 1996 [13]. For 30 days the Boeing 757 sat dor-
mant in a hangar in the Dominican Republic without
a protective cover on its Pitot tubes. Somehow, likely
due to a mud-dauber wasp nest, one of the Pitot tubes
became clogged. The pilot noticed that his indicated
airspeed was incorrect (too slow) during takeoff, but as
the trapped air began to expand during ascent it cre-
ated an artificially high indicated airspeed, and the pi-
lot believed the problem to be fixed. Soon an overspeed
alarm began to sound, resulting in the pilot decreasing
thrust, despite an accurate reading from the co-pilot’s
airspeed indicator and the center console backup indi-
cator both contradicting the pilot’s indicator. The stall
warning began to sound, causing information overload
and confusion. Unaware of his dangerously low speed
and high attitude, the pilot attempted to save the plane
by increasing thrust, resulting in an engine flame out.
The plane spiraled into the ocean.
Air France flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil to Paris, France, June 1, 2009 [4]. The
Airbus A330 encountered adverse weather over the At-
lantic ocean, resulting in a clogged Pitot-static system.
Consequently, the airspeed indicators delivered unreli-
able data concerning airspeed to the pilot flying, re-
sulting in confusion. A chain of events transpired in
which the pilot overcorrected the plane’s horizontal at-
titude again and again, and continued to input nose
up pitch commands, all while losing airspeed. Perhaps
most confusing to the pilot was the following situation:
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the aircraft’s angle of attack (AOA) was so high it was
considered invalid by the computer, so no stall warning
sounded until the nose pitched down into the valid AOA
range, at which point the stall warning would sound.
When the pilot pulled up, the AOA would be consid-
ered invalid again, and the stall warning would cease.
The aircraft entered a spin and crashed into the ocean.
Palmer [25] argues that had the pilot merely taken no
action, the Pitot tubes would have cleared in a matter
of seconds, and the autopilot could have returned to
Normal Mode.
In each of the above cases, the pilot does not know
some crucial piece of information, and he is unaware
of this failure, even though he knows there is a prob-
lem in general. Several cases also involve confusion due
to information overload and contradictory alarms. The
relevant data often were directly available to the pilot
in each case, but he failed to notice them, and formed a
false belief based on what he saw. Had he noticed, there
is a good chance he would have realized his knowledge
failure and ceased to provide problematic inputs to the
aircraft. Thus, the problem is not an absence of infor-
mation, but that a more appropriate management of
its relationship with the pilot’s mental state is needed.
Examining these incidents on this level of abstraction
reveals a specific similarity among them. Having estab-
lished that this class of errors exists, we turn to their
formal analysis using epistemic logic.
3 The Logic
The logics we use in this paper belong to a family
of modal logics, which increase the expressiveness of
propositional logic with modal operators for things like
necessity and possibility [19,29,5]. Epistemic logic is
a modal logic for reasoning about knowledge [16,15].
It was developed by philosophers and economists who
were interested in formally analyzing knowledge in agent-
based systems. Doxastic logic is a related logic for rea-
soning about belief [17]. Modal logics often share a re-
lated semantics, called Kripke semantics, and they dif-
fer primarily in the details of those semantics and their
interpretation or application to the real world.
A Kripke frame is a tuple 〈W,Ri〉, where W is a
non-empty set of possible worlds, and each Ri is a re-
lation between worlds. We can obtain different modal-
ities by varying conditions that constrain the relation.
A modal logic corresponds to a class of frames with
each axiom in the logic uniquely determined by a single
frame condition. A multi-modal logic, that is, a logic
with more than one modal operator, has a relation Ri
for each modal operator. Our logic contains modal op-
erators for a single pilot’s belief and knowledge, with
relations Rb and Rk respectively.
A Kripke structure is a graph that serves as seman-
tics for modal logics. Formally, the structure is a tuple
〈W,Ri ,V〉, where W is a set of worlds, R is a relation
R ⊆ W ×W, and V is a valuation function that takes
a propositional constant and returns the set of worlds
in which the proposition is true. A Kripke structure is
basically a Kripke frame with propositional constants
added to each world, corresponding to what is true and
false in each world.
The general syntax for a modal logic is the following:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ,
where p is a propositional constant from some set of
propositional constants, and  denotes necessity.
The language has the semantics given in Figure 1
We define ∨ , ⇒ in the usual way, and the operator
♦ ≡ ¬¬, denoting possibility. Our modal logics for
this paper will be identical syntactically and seman-
tically to these general definitions, but for the syntax
and semantics for the modal operators, which will have
relations specific to them.
In addition to the above semantics, all normal modal
logics include the following rules of inference:
Necessitation:
` ϕ
` ϕ
Modus Ponens:
` ϕ
` ϕ ⇒ ψ
` ψ
The modal logic we describe is normal, and so in-
cludes the above inference rules, with the appropriately
substituted modal operator in the case of Necessitation.
Having described modal logic in general, we now
turn to the specific modal logics to be used in this pa-
per.
3.1 Epistemic Logic
In all of the cases we consider, we wish to reason
about what a pilot does not know, and as such, we must
be able to formally express this. This section describes
the epistemic logic that we will use.
The syntax and semantics are the same as those
for all modal logics, with the relation Rk denoting an
epistemic relation between worlds for a pilot. The re-
lation captures the notion of how the world might be,
given the evidence available to the agent. For our pi-
lot, a world is the current state of the airplane, and the
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For w ∈W,R ⊆W ×W,
V : PropConst→ P(W),
W,w |= p iff w ∈ V(p)
W,w |= ¬ϕ iff not W,w |= ϕ
W,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff W,w |= ϕ and W,w |= ψ
W,w |= ϕ iff For all u s.t. wRu, W,u |= ϕ
not W,w |= False.
Fig. 1: The Semantics of Modal Logic
way the world might be depends on what his instru-
ments say. If one altimeter reads 30, 000 feet and an-
other reads 20, 000 feet, then the pilot considers both
to be possible, and therefore does not know his altitude.
That is, of course, assuming he notices the discrepancy.
If he has paid attention to only one altimeter, then he
might believe something false. To capture this scenario,
we introduce doxastic logic in the next section.
We use the normal Kripke semantics for truth in our
models. The relation defined over the Kripke frame is
reflexive and transitive, satisfying the desired epistemic
properties, presented below. We denote knowledge with
the K operator, which corresponds to  above. We de-
note epistemic possibility, the dual of knowledge, with
〈K〉 , defined 〈K〉 ≡ ¬K¬, just as with ♦ above.
Epistemic logic includes the following axioms with
corresponding frame conditions, which represent ideal-
ized assumptions about knowledge.
The first axiom holds for all Kripke structures, so
any system to be reasoned about using a modal logic
with Kripke semantics must include this axiom.
Axiom 1 (Distribution of K )
K (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (Kϕ ⇒ Kψ). An agent knows every-
thing that is a logical consequence to his knowledge, also
called logical omniscience.
We follow the standard view in epistemology that
truth is a necessary condition for knowledge. Formally,
this corresponds to a frame condition saying the epis-
temic relation is reflexive, meaning that for all worlds
w, (w,w) ∈ Rk, yielding the following axiom:
Axiom 2 (Knowledge is True) Kϕ ⇒ ϕ
The next axiom says that an agent may reflect on
what he knows and be aware of it, called Positive In-
trospection.
Axiom 3 (Positive Introspection) Kϕ ⇒ K Kϕ.
If an agent knows that φ, then he knows that he knows
that φ.
The axiom of Positive introspection corresponds to a
transitive property of the epistemic relation.
The fourth condition says that an agent can reflect
on what he currently does not know and be aware of
it. In Rumsfeldian terms, all unknowns are known un-
knowns. Formally, this corresponds to a frame condition
that the epistemic relation satisfies the Euclidean prop-
erty, which, in conjunction with the other properties,
makes the relation an equivalence relation.1
Property 1 (Negative Introspection) ¬Kϕ ⇒ K¬Kϕ.
If an agent does not know φ, then he knows that he
does not know φ.
A moment’s reflection reveals that the idealized as-
sumptions do not hold generally for human knowledge.
However, assuming them as idealizations causes no harm
for the most part, with the exception of Negative Intro-
spection. We are concerned with identifying failures of
negative introspection for the pilot and correcting them.
We can assist the pilot in becoming more like an ideal
reasoner, resulting in better decisions. In formalizing
the above class of errors, we relax the assumption that
the pilot has negative introspection, but we keep the
other properties as axioms. To avoid confusion, nega-
tive introspection is labelled as a mere property which
may or may not be true of a model. Table 1 summarizes
the frame conditions and the corresponding axioms of
our epistemic logic.
Theorem 1 For all formulas φ and ψ, and models M
with Rk as a reflexive, transitive relation, the following
hold:
1. M |= (Kϕ ∧ K (ϕ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ Kψ.
2. M |= Kϕ ⇒ ϕ.
3. M |= Kϕ ⇒ K Kϕ.
Proof See [16] pages 33-34. uunionsq
1 A Euclidean relation is defined as follows, for any relation
R, and elements x,y, z, if (x,y) ∈ R, and (x, z) ∈ R, then
(y, z) ∈ R.
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Frame Condition Axiom
N/A Distribution Axiom (Knowledge)
K (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (Kϕ ⇒ Kψ).
Reflexive Knowledge is True
wRkw Kϕ ⇒ ϕ
Transitive Epistemic Positive Introspection
wRku ∧ uRkv =⇒ wRkv Kϕ ⇒ KKϕ.
Table 1: Epistemic Logic Frame Conditions and Corresponding Axioms
Our model of a pilot’s mental situation requires a
distinction between belief and knowledge, and we have
the logical tools accomplish this by introducing another
modality. Next we introduce and discuss doxastic logic.
3.2 Doxastic Logic
The syntax for doxastic logic is exactly analogous to
that of epistemic logic, with the B operator replacing
K , and 〈B〉 replacing 〈K〉 [17]. Similarly, the seman-
tics are Kripke structures, with the accessibility relation
determined by slightly different frame conditions.
Doxastic logic, like Epistemic logic, allows B to dis-
tribute over ⇒ :
Axiom 4 (Distribution of B )
B (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (Bϕ ⇒ Bψ).
The primary difference between knowledge and be-
lief is that beliefs might be false. Thus, the doxastic
relation should not be valid on reflexive frames, a con-
dition which guarantees truth. Instead, we follow the
literature by imposing a relaxed condition, that agents’
beliefs are consistent. Formally, this corresponds to a
serial frame condition on the doxastic relation stating
that for all w, there exists a u such that wRbu.
Axiom 5 (Non-Contradiction) Bϕ ⇒ 〈B 〉ϕ. An
agent does not believe conflicting beliefs. Equivalently
¬(Bϕ ∧ B¬ϕ).
Just as with knowledge, and perhaps more realis-
tically, we assume agents have positive introspection
regarding beliefs.
Axiom 6 (Belief Positive Introspection)
Bϕ ⇒ B Bϕ. If an agent believes that ϕ, then he be-
lieves that he believes ϕ.
The standard approach to doxastic logic, as with
epistemic logic, imposes a Euclidean condition on the
doxastic relation. Without reflexivity, this does not amount
to equivalence, but it is still expressed by a negative in-
trospection property exactly analogous to the one we
omit regarding knowledge. We include it for our doxas-
tic relation.
Axiom 7 (Belief Negative Introspection)
¬Bϕ ⇒ B¬Bϕ. If an agent does not believe that φ,
then he believes that he does not believe that φ.
The above axioms are valid for frames with a serial,
transitive, and reflexive doxastic relation. Table 2 sum-
marizes the frame conditions and their corresponding
axioms.
Theorem 2 For all formulas φ and ψ, and models M
with Rb as a serial, transitive, Euclidean relation, the
following hold:
1. M |= (Bϕ ∧ B (ϕ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ Bψ.
2. M |= ¬B (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ).
3. M |= Bϕ ⇒ B Bϕ.
4. M |= ¬Bϕ ⇒ B¬Bϕ.
Proof ( 1) Suppose M,w |= (Bϕ ∧ B (ϕ ⇒ ψ)). Then
M,w |= Bϕ and M,w |= (Bϕ ⇒ Bψ). By Rb, for all u
such that wRbu, u |= ϕ and u |= ϕ ⇒ ψ. So u |= ψ.
Thus, for all u, where wRbu, u |= ψ, and therefore
M,w |= Bψ.
(2) Suppose that M,w |= B (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ). Because Rb
is serial, there exists some u such that wRbu, and by
definition of B , it must be that u |= ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ, a contra-
diction. Thus, for all w ,M,w |= ¬B (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ).
(3) Suppose M,w |= Bϕ, then M, u |= ϕ for all u
such that wRbu. Since Rb is serial, there is a world v
such that uRbv Because Rb is transitive then wRbv .
From the definition of B and wRbv it follows that
v |= ϕ. Since uRbv we can conclude u |= Bϕ. Since
wRbu,M,w |= B Bϕ.
(4) Suppose M,w |= ¬Bϕ. Because Rb is Euclidean,
for all w , u, v , if wRbu and wRbv , then uRbv . By def-
inition of 〈B〉 ,w |= 〈B〉 ¬ϕ, so for some u, such that
wRbu, u |= ¬ϕ. For all v , such that wRbv , vRbu. Thus,
v |= 〈B〉 ¬ϕ, or equivalently, v |= ¬Bϕ. Therefore,
M,w |= B¬Bϕ. uunionsq
This concludes our discussion of the doxastic compo-
nent to our logic, and we now turn to combining the
modalities.
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Frame Condition Axiom
N/A Distribution Axiom (Belief)
B (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (Bϕ ⇒ Bψ)
Serial Non-Contradiction
∀ w ∃ u. (w,u) ∈ Rb ¬B (φ ∧ ¬ϕ).
Transitive Belief Positive Introspection
(w,u) ∈ Rb and (u,v) ∈ Rb ⇒ (w,v) ∈ Rb Bϕ ⇒ BBϕ.
Euclidean Belief Negative Introspection
(w,u) ∈ Rb and (w,v) ∈ Rb ⇒ (u,v) ∈ Rb ¬Bϕ ⇒ B¬Bϕ.
Table 2: Doxastisc Logic Frame Conditions and Corresponding Axioms
3.3 Combining the Logics
When we combine these two modal logics, we generate
the multimodal logic ASL, for “Agent Safety Logic”.
We must define the conditions that govern the relation-
ship between the modalities, that is, how knowledge and
belief logically interact.
The semantics of ASL is defined in terms of both
the epistemic and doxastic relation. The frame condi-
tion Rb ⊆ Rk imposes a partial order on the modalities
[1]. The partial order gives rise to a basic property of
knowledge, that knowledge entails belief.
Axiom 8 (Knowledge Entails Belief) Kϕ ⇒ Bϕ.
If a pilot knows that φ, then he believes that φ.
However, knowledge and belief are still distinct from
each other, because one can generate a counterexample
to the converse epistemic principle, that belief entails
knowledge. Instead, we impose a restricted version of
the converse, expressed by an axiom to follow. We de-
note justified belief by the composition of the Rb and
Rk relations: Rk◦Rb. This captures the internal compo-
nent of justification, where the pilot has direct epistemic
access to his reasons for believing a proposition. If he
believes it, and he has a good reason, then he thinks
it is true, so he thinks he knows it. Thus, he justifiedly
believes p iff he believes that he knows p.
Counterexample ¬(Bϕ ⇒ Kϕ). Consider the world
W = {t , u, v} with the following truth assignment v 6∈
V(ϕ), u ∈ V(ϕ), and t ∈ V(ϕ), and the following rela-
tion over W :
Rk = {(v , v)} ∪Rb
Rb = {(v , u), (u, t), (t , u), (t , t), (u, u)}
This is illustrated in Figure 2, where Rk is represented
by the dotted edge and Rb by the solid edges. We there-
fore have v |= Bϕ, because u, t |= ϕ, but v |= ¬Kϕ,
because v |= ¬ϕ.
Axiom 9 (Justified Belief) Bϕ ⇒ B Kϕ. If a pilot
believes that ϕ, then he believes that he knows that ϕ.
u : ϕ
v : ¬ϕ
Bϕ;¬Kϕ
t : ϕ
Fig. 2: Counterexample
This corresponds to the frame condition (Rk◦Rb) ⊆ Rb,
and represents the restricted converse of Axiom 8, and
the view that pilots believe things about the aircraft
only if they have good reason, like a particular instru-
ment reading indicating as much. We can think of this
property as representing the notion that all pilot beliefs
are justified, even if they are in fact false.
Table 3 summarizes the axioms and frame condi-
tions of the combined logic.
The following lemma follows from Axiom 9.
Lemma 1 (Epistemic Principle 2)
B Kϕ ⇒ ¬K¬Kϕ. If a pilot believes that he knows
that ϕ, then he does not know that he does not know
that ϕ.
Proof From Axiom 5 B Kϕ ⇒ 〈B 〉Kϕ, and the con-
traposition of Axiom 8 yields 〈B 〉Kϕ ⇒ ¬K¬Kϕ. uunionsq
For this principle to be applied to the real world, we
must ask whether agents can believe they know some-
thing even if they know that they do not know it, for
in that case the principle would be falsified. Cases like
this might occur when sensory input conflicts with level-
headed rational thinking, as in a hallucination or spatial
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Frame Condition Axiom
Partially Ordered Knowledge Entails Belief
Rb ⊆ Rk Kϕ ⇒ Bϕ.
Composition Justified Belief
(Rk ◦Rb) ⊆ Rb Bϕ ⇒ BKϕ
Table 3: EDL Frame Conditions and Corresponding Axioms
χ4
χ5 χ3
χ1 χ2
χ6
χ7
C ′′C ′
C
Fig. 3: FSM (α) = C ∨ C ′ ∨ C ′′.
MSC (α) = (χ1 ∧ χ2) = χ
disorientation. Indeed, such confusions can occur dur-
ing flight, where a pilot’s senses create a powerful feeling
of one orientation or another, which disagrees with all
reason and instrumentation. Pilots are trained to ignore
their senses in these situations, and rely instead on their
instruments. This research does not address pilot train-
ing, so we assume the pilots in our model follow their
training, and resist beliefs that conflict with knowledge
based on instrumentation. The cases we have selected
for analysis involve false beliefs based on faulty instru-
ments or inattention, not adverse sensory perception,
so we avoid the cases where Lemma 1 might not apply.
This concludes our discussion of epistemic and dox-
astic logic. We now turn to a formalization of safety.
3.4 Formalizing Safety
Results from game theory and decision theory establish
a strong connection between the quality of an agent’s
decision and his epistemic state [2] [3]. We follow the
spirit of these results in our formalization of pilot ratio-
nality, although we leave many formal details for future
work. Note that we use ‘rationality’ as a technical term
here, meaning roughly that an agent makes decisions
based on minimizing some measure of disutility associ-
ated with actions, determined by a flight safety manual.
For rationality, we are concerned only with whether
a pilot’s action is safe given what he believes the current
flight data to be. Safety propositions are of the form ‘the
flight data χ say action α is safe’. A pilot’s rationality
then, is a logical connection between action and beliefs
about safety propositions.
Think of the flight safety manual as an association
between actions and complete configurations of instru-
ment readings, formalized as the function FSM (α):
FSM (α) = (χ0 ∧ ... ∧ χn) ∨ (χm ∧ ... ∧ χk )...
It indicates the conditions χi under which an action is
safe. Each conjunction (χi ∧ ... ∧ χj) is a maximally
complete configuration C of instrument readings, χi .
Each instrument reading χi is an atomic proposition
of type FD ⊂ PropConst, where FD stands for flight
data. Each action α is an atomic proposition of type
Actions ⊂ PropConst. For notation purposes, if a con-
figuration’s conjunction does not contain a propositional
constant, then that constant is false in the conjunction.
The flight safety manual may indicate that an action
is safe under many possible configurations. We identify
the instrument readings that are true in all safe config-
urations by simplifying the FSM , extracting each con-
stant and its negation, for example:
simplify((p ∧ q ∧ s) ∨ (p ∧ q ∧ ¬s)) = p ∧ q
To associate with each action a particular partial
configuration, we define the minimal safety condition
MSC :
MSC (α)
def
= simplify(FSM (α)),
which yields a conjunction of χi instrument readings
true in all safe configurations. This conjunction is no
longer maximally complete, so it is called a partial con-
figuration. We refer to this conjunction with the special
name χ.2 Figure 3 illustrates the definition of FSM and
MSC of α.
A safety proposition can be formalized using a modal
operator S, where χSα stands for: the configuration χ
says α is safe, according to the flight safety manual.
2 A special case is if the FSM (α) simplifies to complemen-
tary conjunctions, in which case χ is their disjunction.
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We extend the syntax of our logic to include safety.
ϕ ::= ... | χSα | ,
For the semantics of S, we have the following:
w |= χSα iff w |= χ ∧ ∃v , w(Safety)v ∧ v |= α
We define the Safety relation in terms of the MSC re-
lation:
Safety
def
= {(w , v)|w ∈ V (MSC (α)), v ∈ V (α)}.
The following lemma holds.
Lemma 2 (Safety to Flight Data) χSα ⇒ χ. If χ
says α is safe, then χ is true.
Proof Suppose w |= χSα. Then w |= χ, by the seman-
tics of S. uunionsq
In addition, we define
Safety(w)
def
= {v |(w , v) ∈ Safety},
where Safety(w) is a partial application of the Safety
relation, returning the set of worlds in the relevant
codomain, specifically those with the permissible ac-
tions. This allows us to define basic pilot safety.
For basic pilot safety, the notion of rationality we
are concerned with, we want the following intuitive sit-
uation to hold. Take a world at which α holds and step
down the doxastic relation to another world, w′, where
χ the minimal safety condition of α is true, and from
there one may find a world v reachable by the Safety
relation where α is true, capturing the notion that a
pilot believes he is in a world where α is safe according
to the current flight data. Formally, this is:
Property 2 (Basic Pilot Safety Condition) A pilot has
basic safety iff for all actions α, and for all w ∈ V(α),
Rb(w) ⊆ V (χ), where χ = MSC (α), and (Safety ◦
Rb)(w)
⋂
V(α) 6= ∅.
Axiom 10 (Basic Pilot Safety) α ⇒ B (χSα). A
basically safe pilot engages in action α only if he be-
lieves that the flight data indicate the action is safe.3
This is perhaps the weakest claim one can make about
the nature of rationality, wherein the pilot acts only if
he at least believes the action to be overall safe.
Theorem 3 (BPS Valid) Axiom 10 is valid for all
frames with Property 2.
3 Sometimes pilots will take “unsafe” action to mitigate
what they perceive to be the greatest safety concern. For our
purposes, we consider the action’s warrant in terms of the
all-things-considered safety of the plane.
Proof Suppose w |= α. Because the pilot is basically
safe,
Rb(w) ⊆ V (χ) and (Safety ◦Rb)(w)
⋂
V(α) 6= ∅.
The doxastic relation is serial, so there is at least one
world, call it w ′, such that wRbw ′. Then, by the BPS
condition, χ is true at w ′, and we can partially apply
Safety to w ′ and find some v such that w ′(Safety)v , and
v |= α, also by the BPS condition. Recall the semantics
of w ′ |= χSα, that w ′ |= χ and there exists some v ,
where w ′(Safety)v and v |= α. This holds for w ′, so
w ′ |= χSα. Since wRbw ′, it follows that w |= B (χSα).
uunionsq
From this we deduce the following stronger property
of pilot rationality.
Lemma 3 (Pilot Rationality) α ⇒ B K (χSα),
where α is the proposition that the pilot engages in some
action. The pilot performs some action (which turns
out to be dangerous) only if he believes that he knows
that the flight data indicates that the action is safe. In
essence, the pilot acts only in ways that he thinks he
knows are overall safe. The principle highlights the fact
that rational pilots are cautious and risk-averse.
Proof Follows from Axiom 9 and Axiom 10. uunionsq
Finally, we complete the thread from action to knowl-
edge of flight data, with the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Action to Flight Data) α ⇒ B Kχ.
A pilot engages in an action only if he believes that he
knows some relevant flight data.
Proof Follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 2. uunionsq
3.5 Analyzing Pilot Error
We can now use these formal tools to analyze the class
of accidents from section 2. We formalize the accidents
in the same way that one might formalize an argument
in natural language, or represent a circuit as a formula
in digital logic. We identify aspects of the case that
matter logically, and appropriately represent them in
the formal language. We start with Air India Flight 855,
wherein the pilot did not know the plane’s attitude, but
provided banking commands as if he did know.
Example (Air India 855) Let α be the proposition,
“the pilot commands a steep left bank.” Let χ be the
flight data expressing the proposition “all artificial hori-
zons indicate a steep right bank”. As a matter of fact,
χ is false, because the current flight data included con-
trary bank attitude data, which proscribed a steep left
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Frame Condition Axiom
BPS Condition Basic Pilot Safety
∀α,∀w ∈ V(α), Rb(w) ⊆ V (χ) and α ⇒ B (χSα)
(Safety ◦Rb)(w)
⋂
V(α) 6= ∅
Table 4: Basic Pilot Safety Frame Condition and Corresponding Axiom
bank. By Axiom 2, we have ¬Kχ. We assume the pilot
is minimally rational, so he commands a steep left bank
only if he believes that he knows the aircraft’s bank at-
titude permits a steep left bank: α ⇒ B K (χSα). Fur-
thermore, it follows that he believes he knows χ, the
flight data that would make α safe: α ⇒ B Kχ. Of
course, it is also a fact of the case that the pilot com-
mands a steep left bank, α. Thus, he believes that he
knows the relevant data: B Kχ. By Epistemic Prinici-
ple 2, it follows that he considers it possible that he
knows his action is permitted by the data: ¬K¬Kχ.
Thus, combining this with the earlier fact of the case,
we have ¬Kχ ∧ ¬K¬Kχ. But recall from proposi-
tional logic that ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ≡ ¬(ϕ ⇒ ψ). Substituting
ϕ := ¬Kχ, and ψ := K¬Kχ, we have,
¬(¬Kχ ⇒ K¬Kχ), which is the failure of negative
introspection about the flight data safety-related to his
dangerous action.
Example (Birgenair 301)
– Let χ ≡ “The airspeed data all indicate a danger-
ously high airspeed”
– α ≡“The pilot reduces thrust.”
Then we have, by the same reasoning as above, a fail-
ure of negative introspection that the airspeed data all
indicate a dangerously high airspeed. That is, he does
not know the airspeed data are such and such, and he
does not know that he lacks this knowledge.
By identical reasoning and the appropriate assign-
ment of propositions, one can formally prove that in
each of the cases previously presented, a failure of neg-
ative introspection logically follows. We illustrate this
in Table 5.
In each case, the pilot performs some dangerous ac-
tion, and he does not know some data appropriately
related to that action, whether it be airspeed or control
mode. Our analysis proceeds by formally representing
the general form of the cases, wherein a pilot is rational,
takes dangerous action, and lacks relevant knowledge.
The analysis yields the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Negative Introspection Failure) A
rational pilot lacking knowledge of data entailing an ac-
tion to be safe performs that action only if he lacks neg-
ative introspection regarding the safety-related data to
that action.
Proof We assume that the pilot acts in some danger-
ous way, w |= α, and that he lacks knowledge of some
relevant information, w |= ¬Kχ. We proceed to show
that w |= ¬K¬Kχ follows. By Lemma 3 the pilot
does α only if he believes he knows the current flight
data χ says α is safe: α ⇒ B K (χSα), from which by
Theorem 4, w |= α ⇒ B Kχ follows. By Lemma 1,
w |= B Kχ ⇒ ¬K¬Kχ. Thus, w |= ¬K¬Kχ (dis-
charging the assumption w |= α).
Therefore, w |= ¬Kχ ⇒ ¬K¬Kχ. uunionsq
We can see from the above that the pilot’s action
in the case, when formalized in ASL, logically entails
that the pilot lacks negative introspection. Thus, we
have good reason to think that a failure of negative
introspection with respect to certain data plays a cru-
cial role leading up to the incident, as it is a necessary
condition to the action.
We can now identify a key insight resulting from our
formal analysis. If we wish to prevent the pilot from
engaging in the dangerous action, we must enable the
flight deck management system to detect the particular
failure and encourage the pilot’s negative introspection
on the data. If the premises jointly entail a failure of
negative introspection, and we somehow grant the pilot
negative introspection, then one of the premises must
become false, by the logical rule of Modus Tollens. The
only candidate premises to falsify are 1) ¬Kχ and 2)
α, as the rest are theorems.
Theorem 6 (Negative Introspection vs Action)
If a rational pilot with missing safety data has negative
introspection, then he does not execute a dangerous ac-
tion.
For proof, we map the argument from proof of The-
orem 5 into propositional logic.
– Let a ≡ α (the pilot engages in a dangerous action),
– ¬(kf) ≡ ¬Kχ above (the pilot does not know the
flight data related to the action),
– r ≡ Lemma 3 above (the pilot is rational),
– ¬ni ≡ the conclusion above.
Proof (1) (r ∧ a ∧ ¬(kf)) ⇒ ¬ni Thm 5
(2) ni Assumed
(3) ¬r ∨ ¬a ∨ kf from (1), (2)
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Aeroperu 603 χ ≡ “No instruments confirm that the altitude is dangerously low”
α ≡ “The pilot reduces pitch”
Air France 447 χ ≡ “All instruments indicate dangerous overspeed”
α ≡ “The pilot increases pitch”
Table 5: Unknown flight data and dangerous actions
(4) ¬kf Assumed
(5) r Assumed
(6) Therefore, ¬a (3), (4), (5)
uunionsq
The lack of knowledge of χ cannot be fixed in most
cases. Typically, the instrumentation is experiencing a
mechanical error of some kind, causing the autopilot
to disconnect and return control to the pilot. In this
case, the instruments are unreliable, and so knowledge
is prevented.
This leaves only pilot rationality and the dangerous
action. We assume pilot rationality for the formal work,
but it is important to keep in mind that our solution
must not inhibit the pilot’s rationality, for example by
contributing to information overload. Thus, our solu-
tion is to encourage negative introspection in such a
way as to also encourage pilot rationality. Doing this
formally falsifies assumption α, that the pilot engages
in dangerous action, giving us good reason to think that
the pilot will actually avoid engaging in the dangerous
action in the real world, assuming our formalization
does a good job modeling the real world.
4 Future Work
Safety in highly automated modern cockpits requires
interdisciplinary input from human factors experts, safety
engineers, systems engineers, and aerospace engineers,
all of whom collaborate to improve safety. We believe
logicians can also make important contributions by for-
mally modeling pilot reasoning. Having demonstrated
the value of analyzing loss of pilot situational aware-
ness from an epistemic logic perspective, we recom-
mend future work to investigate combining modal rea-
soning with modern sensor technology to improve cock-
pit safety.
Our analysis suggests that there is a potential ad-
vantage in an approach that embraces teamwork in
the pilot-autopilot relationship, in which the autopilot
monitors the pilot and actively finds ways to properly
assist, rather than an active decider/passive informer
relationship.
Second, and importantly, our analysis suggests in-
vestigating a shift from an alert model centered on the
idea that brighter is better, toward a more focused
way of differentially brightening the right things at the
right time, and dimming the rest. The flow of informa-
tion from the flight deck to the pilot is a resource to
be managed just like any other, with priority given to
information that can immediately stop the pilot from
doing something dangerous. The phenomenon of infor-
mation overload during emergency situations plays a
large role in the resulting incidents by diminishing the
pilot’s decision-making ability [20] [28]. For whatever
psychological reasons, an excess of information seems
to decrease an agent’s situational awareness. In our for-
malization, this amounts to a falsification of pilot ra-
tionality. So a solution must alert the pilot in a way
that does not overload his senses and diminish his ra-
tional decision-making. If pilot rationality is false, then
an encouragement of negative introspection does not
necessarily prevent a dangerous action. Modern avion-
ics have many safeguards built in to alert the pilot that
they are taking unsafe action. Yet we have seen that
they can overwhelm a crew, and especially an individ-
ual pilot during an emergency. An alternative approach
would seek to encourage negative introspection without
diminishing pilot rationality. We believe this can be ac-
complished by removing extraneous data from the pi-
lot’s attention, by dimming temporarily irrelevant data,
so that he can notice the critical piece of information
without being overwhelmed. In future work, we hope to
collaborate closely with the human factors community
and validate our approach through empirical testing.
5 Related Work
The work presented by this paper lies at the inter-
section of formal methods and human-computer inter-
action.
Previous researchers have applied formal mathemat-
ical methods to the analysis of mode confusion [26], [10],
[27], [8]. Mode confusion is a phenomenon that occurs
when a pilot believes that an airplane is under the auto-
mated protections of a particular autopilot flight mode
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when in fact it is not. Though viewed as a distinct phe-
nomenon, we think cases of mode confusion and nega-
tive introspection failure overlap. A pilot might be con-
fused about the aircraft’s mode, and as a result of this
come to believe false things about the state of the air-
craft. For example, if he believes it is in a mode that
prevents the airspeed from falling below a certain level,
and fails to glance at his airspeed indicator for some
time. He would not know his airspeed, and would not
know that he did not know it.
Chen, Ely, and Luo [11] analyze “Agent A is un-
aware that P” as “Agent A does not know that he does
not know P”, consistent with our analysis of cases in
which a pilot is unaware of some piece of information.
Rushby [26] and Combefis [12] bring formal methods
to bear on the analysis and discovery of automated sur-
prises, which are closely related to the notion of mode
confusion. Where mode confusion refers to a pilot’s not
knowing some feature of the aircraft’s current mode, au-
tomated surprises are the frequent result, where some
feature of the mode produces behavior that the pilot
did not expect.
Oishi et. al. [24] describe a method for identifying
the minimal amount of information required by the pi-
lot in order to safely perform a maneuver, and for prov-
ing that a given interface provides this sufficient infor-
mation. This is extremely promising work in the effort
to reduce information overload, a shared goal of this
paper, and future extensions of our research will surely
appeal to their work in showing that the temporary
removal of instrument data will not result in a more
dangerous circumstance than the one being solved. If
our solution is to, for instance, remove unnecessary in-
strument data in order to show the pilot that the air-
speed data is contradictory, and the correct action in re-
sponse requires knowledge of attitude and thrust, then
our mechanism must not remove those data from the
pilot’s awareness. The work of Oishi et. al. will help us
identify the minimally sufficient information for execut-
ing a correct control input while also highlighting the
failure of negative introspection to the pilot.
Bolton et. al. [6] [7] apply model checking to the
relationship between a human operator and a system.
They do so by incorporating the operator’s behavior
into a task analytic model of the system, along with
task analytic models of its other components. They then
characterize the normative behaviors of the operator as
component tasks to be verified. If a model can be found
in which a normative behavior fails, then this represents
a potential case of human error. This relates to our
work in that it formalizes the human component of a
system and identifies errors that can occur. However,
their approach applies during the specification phase,
while ours identifies a method for relating the pilot’s
actions to his mental picture of the aircraft, which could
be used as part of a real-time safety monitor of the pilot.
For more on the application of modal logic to various
aspects of knowledge and agency, see chapters in the
Handbook of Philosophical Logic [22], the Handbook of
Epistemic Logic [15], any number of recent papers by
van Benthem et. al., [29] for example. Future extensions
of this work will incorporate a modal analysis of action,
extensive work on which has been done by Horty [18]
and Broersen [9], among others.
6 Conclusion and Acknowledgements
In this paper, we applied basic tools from epistemic
logic to the analysis of a specific class of pilot error.
This formal analysis revealed a relationship between
dangerous actions, pilot rationality, and a pilot’s neg-
ative introspection. By exploiting this relationship, we
can mitigate the role the class of error plays in avia-
tion accidents. We illustrated the role logic can play
in the safety engineering community, by taking formal
work done in philosophy and economics, and using it
to analyze the human component of complex systems.
This improves researchers’ ability to automate and rig-
orously test safety procedures meant to mitigate human
error. In future work, we hope to further explore this
work by using our logic to develop algorithms that si-
multaneously encourage negative introspection and pi-
lot rationality.
We would like to acknowledge Kelly Hayhurst and
C. Michael Holloway for their insights on safety. We
would also like to thank Aaron Dutle for helping us im-
prove the presentation of the mathematical results in
the paper. We especially acknowledge Brenton Weath-
ered for his valuable insights in interpreting accident
reports and helping us understand pilot behavior.
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